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Abstract
This paper discusses the impact of trade liberalisation and R&D policies
on exporting firms’ incentive to innovate and social welfare. Key
factors determining the government’s optimal policy are the strength
of R&D spillover eﬀect and the toughness of firm competition. When
firms only compete in an overseas market, the optimal policy is to
tax R&D. Trade liberalisation in the overseas market induces a higher
R&D tax rate to be imposed on firms. When firms also conduct busi-
ness in the home market, the government should financially support
firms’ R&D. Trade liberalisation always increases firms’ output sales,
R&D investments, and social welfare.
Keywords: Trade, R&D spillovers, subsidies, welfare, process innova-
tion.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, there has been an increasing number of countries
that adopt export promoting trade strategy for their economic development
path. Following this strategy, firms are encouraged by their national gov-
ernments to export their products to an overseas market. Expected gains of
this trade policy are many of which the most visible ones include generating
foreign exchange revenue, increasing employment and improving production
eﬃciency. However, the successful implementation of this policy is not al-
ways compelling. On the one hand, it depends on external factors such as
demand and regulations in the international market. On the other hand, it is
subject to the competitiveness of exporting firms. Hence, in order to survive
and develop in such a competitive market place, firms need to improve their
productivity and in that process, innovation is essential. From a policy stand-
point, a government can support their domestic exporting firms by providing
them with either export or R&D subsidies. However, as export subsidies
are often restricted due to international agreements, providing subsidies to
firms’ R&D activities become the most eﬀective policy tool of any national
governments nowadays. Several studies such as Spencer and Brander (1983),
Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Brander (1995), Neary and Leahy (2000), and
Leahy and Neary (2001) even find that subsidising R&D is more powerful
than subsidising exports.
Clearly, trade liberalisation and R&D policies are closely related. While
trade liberalisation aﬀects factors impacting innovation activities such as
market size and toughness of competition, R&D investment determines the
benefits of undertaking the trade. It is surprising that not much has been
done to examine the links between these two policy factors although there
exists rich branches of literature studying each factor separately. Filling this
gap will be the main task of this paper. In doing so, this paper considers
the issue of exporting duopoly1 in a basic model of strategic R&D with trade
liberalisation occurring in an exporting market.2 Here, firms produce hori-
1This market structure fits well with some special industries such as civil aviation. In
these industries, due to technical or safety requirements, they are highly regulated by the
government. In addition, in order to start production in these industries, it may require
a substantial amount of initial investment. All these create barriers deterring firms from
entering the market.
2Although it is arguable that exports and imports are highly connected, for the purpose
of focusing on public policies towards supporting exporting firms, this paper does not
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zontally diﬀerentiated products and invest in R&D to reduce their marginal
cost of production. Unlike existing studies, in this paper, R&D investment
has a special feature that it benefits both its own investor and other firms
(through an R&D spillover process). Government policies include providing
a subsidy to the exporting firms to stimulate their R&D activity. However,
it should be noted that the main aim of the government policies is not only
to expand firms’ output sales (in the overseas and/or home market) but also
to maximise domestic welfare. This environment creates a two-stage game
which can be solved by backward induction. In the first stage, the govern-
ment decides on how much to subsidise R&D activity of firms in order to
maximise domestic welfare. In the second stage, firms maximise their profits
by choosing export volumes and/or domestic sales as well as levels of R&D
investment optimally taking into account the subsidy rate provided by the
government and the other firm’s action. The result at the end of the second
stage is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Depending on the setting environment,
the strategic behaviours of the government and firms are diﬀerent and con-
vey diﬀerent implications for the optimal R&D subsidy. However, overall,
common findings are that trade liberalisation is always welfare enhancing as
it helps firms further expand their output sales, both overseas and at home.
Trade liberalisation encourages firms to undertake more cost-reducing R&D
by enlarging their profit margins. This, in turn, improves firms’ and industry
productivity.
The first results are developed in a simple setting with two domestic
exporting firms competing in an overseas niche market. For simplicity, foreign
firms are assumed either non-existent or too small to count on (i.e. they
hold a negligible market share or operate in a completely diﬀerent market
segment).3 A typical example is the rivalry between two Australian airlines
- Qantas and Virgin Australia (in partnership with Delta Air Lines) - in
oﬀering direct flights to American tourists from Los Angeles to Sydney.4
consider imports.
3This simplifying assumption allows us to focus better on the strategic behaviour of
the exporting firms.
4According to Freed (2015a), these are the two dominant carriers in the US - Australia
route, with Qantas holding of 54 per cent and Virgin (combined with Delta) having 25
per cent of market share respectively. In June 2015, American Airlines, currently having
code-sharing arrangement with Qantas, announced that it would re-enter Australia (after
its withdrawal in 1992) through forming a joint venture with the Australian biggest airline
(Airline Leader, 2015).
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The result indicates that factors that shape the government’s policy action
are the strength of R&D spillover eﬀect (a social benefit) and the degree of
firm rivalry (a social cost). This result is new since existing studies in this
related literature are silent about R&D spillover eﬀect. Under some certain
conditions involving these two factors, the government’s optimal policy turns
out to be taxing firms’ R&D activity instead of subsidising it. This is because
too much competition between domestic firms in the foreign market will
erode the power that the home country as a whole can exercise in the foreign
market. This optimal R&D tax increases when trade liberalisation in the
foreign market occurs. This trade liberalisation is also found to induce a
higher level of R&D investments of firms, their productivity and export sales,
and social welfare.
Results on optimal R&D subsidy turn out to be significantly diﬀerent
when exporting firms also conduct business at home.5 The first-best policy
is always to subsidise R&D of firms. This is due to consumer-surplus motive
of subsidising R&D as domestic consumers will gain very much from having
access to diﬀerent varieties. Trade liberalisation implemented by the foreign
market does not always induce a higher optimal R&D subsidy level because
the extra gain from undertaking further R&D may be smaller than its addi-
tional cost. In fact, the monotonicity of this R&D subsidy in the trade cost
depends on the comparison between the R&D spillover eﬀect and the degree
of substitutability between the goods, and to some extent, on the features
of the R&D marginal cost. If R&D investment is not so costly, the marginal
benefit from doing R&D is greater than its cost so the optimal R&D subsidy
increases. By contrast, if R&D investment is an extremely costly activity,
the optimal R&D policy should discourage R&D investment through cutting
down the level of R&D subsidy.
In characterising R&D subsidies, a majority of existing studies (e.g. Brander,
1995; Neary and Leahy, 2000; Leahy and Neary, 2001) only focus on business-
stealing motive and pay little attention to the welfare motive of R&D sub-
sidisation. This is because they do not consider any welfare analysis. Collie
(2002) is among a few exceptions looking at welfare eﬀect of subsidies but
it addresses production subsidies rather than R&D subsidies. Spencer and
Brander (1983) and Haaland and Kind (2008) are studies most closely related
5Here, the example of the rivalry between Qantas and Virgin Australia can also be
applied as they are also main competitors in the Australian domestic civil aviation market
(Freed, 2015b).
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to our paper in terms of studying R&D subsidisation. However, they only re-
strict their attention to competition between a home firm and a foreign firm
rather than that of two exporting firms as presented in our paper. Long et
al. (2011), while studying the impact of trade liberalisation on R&D, do not
consider the subsidisation issue. Similar to Neary and O’Sullivan (1999) and
Leahy and Neary (2004), that paper looks at R&D cooperation/competition
between firms rather than R&D coordination by the government at the policy
stage. To some extent, our paper is also related to Long and Stahler (2009)
in terms of considering strategic behaviour of firms under diﬀerent scenarios.
Nevertheless, their paper focuses on firm ownership and trade policy, not
R&D investment and trade policy as our paper does. Our paper also con-
siders the impact of R&D investment externality, an issue that has not been
fully explored in the R&D-trade related literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a
basic model of competition between exporting firms in an overseas market.
In Section 3, exporting firms are additionally allowed to trade in their home
market. For each case, the existence as well as uniqueness of an optimal
R&D subsidy and its key characteristics is analysed. The impacts of trade
liberalisation on firms’ output sales, their cost-reducing R&D investments
and productivity, and social welfare are also examined. Section 4 ends the
paper with some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Consider two domestic firms i and j whose products are entirely exported to
a foreign country that does not produce these goods.6 7The utility function
of an overseas representative consumer is:
u = ↵qi + ↵qj  
✓
q2i
2
+
q2j
2
+ bqiqj
◆
, b 2 [0 , 1 ), ↵ > 0 (1)
6In this paper, the exporting country is referred to as the home country.
7This modelling assumption also fits well with the case of firms operating in export
processing zones (EPZs) where all of the firm’s products are to be sold in a foreign market.
Sargent and Matthew (2009), in citing statistics provided by The International Labour
Organisation, indicate that by 2002, there had been 116 countries establishing EPZs to
promote their exports. China is often considered as a successful country in this policy
direction. For a more detailed review of EPZs around the world and the China’s EPZ
success, see Sargent and Matthews (2009).
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where qi and qj are consumption of the goods produced by the two firms
respectively; b denotes the degree of substitution between the two goods (the
higher the value of b, the higher the degree of substitutability). When b = 0,
the goods are completely independent and when b tends to its limit of 1, the
goods are identical. This quadratic utility function is standard and has been
used by Haaland and Kind (2008). For simplicity, assume the population
size in the foreign market is equal to 1.
Let pi and pj denote the prices of the two goods in the foreign country.
The consumer surplus of the foreign country can be expressed as:
CS = u   piqi   pj qj
As the consumer maximises his surplus with respect to the quantity of each
good, the (inverse) demand function for good i (and similar for good j) can
be derived as the following:
pi = ↵  (qi + bqj )
Assume that the firms’ products are subject to a trade cost (e.g. import
tariﬀ, transportation or service cost) of rate ⌧ per unit of goods they export
to the foreign market (⌧ > 0). By trade liberalisation in the overseas market,
it is meant an exogenous fall in ⌧ . In the absence of R&D, firms face a same
unit cost of production, c. These imply that in order to sell their products in
the foreign market, firms have to bear the exporting cost of c+ ⌧ . To allow
firms to be able to export even when no R&D activity is conducted, assume
that
Assumption 1 c+ ⌧ < ↵
Firms invest in R&D to reduce their cost of production so that the cost of
production after R&D is c xk where xk (c   xk   0, k = i, j) is the amount
of R&D eﬀort expended by firms. The R&D cost function r(xk) takes the
standard form with the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 The R&D cost function r(xk):
• is positively valued: r(xk) > 0, 8xk   0;
• is strictly increasing: r0(xk) > 0, 8xk > 0; r0(0) = 0; and
• is strictly convex with curvature r00(xk) > max
h
1; (b+5)( +1)
2
(b+2)2
i
, 8xk > 0.
6
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These assumptions, as will be shown later in the Appendix, are necessary
for fulfilling suﬃcient conditions of maximisation problems.8 Based on these
assumptions, the R&D cost function is positively valued, strictly increasing
and strictly convex in the level of R&D eﬀort conducted by firms.
Also assume that the government helps each firm by providing an R&D
subsidy of rate sk (k = i, j) per unit of R&D investment. Hence, the profit
function for firm i (and similar for firm j) is:
⇡i = [pi   (c  xi    xj)  ⌧ ] qi   r(xi) + sixi (2)
where   2 [0, 1] captures the degree of R&D spillovers between firms (when
  = 0, there are no spillovers and when   = 1, there are perfect spillovers).
An assumption that is maintained throughout this paper is that firms obtain
non-negative profits when they enter the production stage of the market.
Each firm will maximise its profit while the domestic government will max-
imise total welfare. Because all goods are exported and not consumed in
domestic market, domestic consumer surplus is zero. Hence, total welfare is
equal to total firms’ profits less R&D subsidy costs:
W =
X
k=i,j
⇡k  
X
k=i,j
skxk (3)
In this paper, we follow Long et al. (2011) in using Merlitz (2003)’s
definition of productivity. Here, firm i’s productivity (and similar for firm
j), zi, is the inverse of its marginal production cost:
zi =
1
c  xi    xj , (4)
and the industry productivity, Z, is the inverse of the average marginal pro-
duction cost of that industry:
Z =
2
(c  xi    xj) + (c  xj    xi) (5)
The above setting provides us with a two-stage game. In the first stage,
the government chooses how much to subsidise firms’ R&D eﬀorts to maxim-
ise social welfare. In the second stage, the firms choose the R&D investment
levels and export volumes to maximise their corresponding profits taking into
account the R&D subsidy rates given in the first stage.9 We will solve this
8A typical example of such an R&D cost function is r(xk) = Ax2k + f where f   0 is
the fixed cost for setting up an R&D project and A > 52 is a constant.
9Generally speaking, firms need to set up R&D projects first before conducting any
production. However, for simplicity, in this paper, we assume that firms make these two
decisions at the same time.
7
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game using backward induction.
Lemma 1 Any solution equilibrium is symmetric. Consider a symmetric
equilibrium where si = sj = s, qi = qj = q, xi = xj = x. If it is interior,10
then
s =
(2   b)q
b+ 2
(6)
Proof. See Appendix.
This result indicates that in this symmetric equilibrium, firms receive a
same amount of subsidy from the government, undertake a same amount of
R&D investment, and exports a same quantity of goods to the foreign market.
It also shows the relationship between the R&D subsidy and the export
volume. Although the government subsidises the firms’ R&D investment,
this indirectly aﬀects the quantity of goods that firms want to sell in the
foreign market.
Remark 1 The relationship between   and s is the following:
• If   = b2 then s = 0.
• If   < b2 then s < 0.
• If   > b2 then s > 0.
Clearly, if   = b2 , the right hand side (RHS) of (6) is equal to zero so its
left hand side (LHS) must be equal to zero as well. In other words s = 0.
Similarly, when   < b2 we have s < 0 and when   >
b
2 , we have s > 0.
This is an important result that links the externality of R&D investment,
 , with the degree of substitutability between the goods, b. From the whole
society’s point of view,   represents the social benefit of undertaking R&D
because R&D is not only good for its own investor but also others in the
market. By contrast, b is somewhat a social cost to the exporting country as
it reflects the rivalry between the exporting firms in the overseas market.11
When   = b2 , the social benefit of undertaking R&D investment cancels out
10Only in Proposition 1 below, under some further assumptions, the solution is actualy
interior.
11According to Haaland and Kind (2008), an increase in b implies a decrease in market
demand. In other words, the size of the market gets smaller when goods become less
diﬀerentiated.
8
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with the corresponding social cost so the government has no incentive to
finance firms’ R&D activity.
A special case that satisfies the condition   = b2 is when   = 0 and
b = 0. In this case, there will be no R&D spillovers between firms and goods
are absolutely diﬀerent (firms are independent monopolies in their product
lines and facing no competition from each other). Hence, we can state the
following:
Corollary 1 When exporting firms are independent monopolies in their own
market product lines (i.e. b = 0) and there are no R&D spillovers between
them (i.e.   = 0), the optimal policy action for the government is to provide
no subsidy to the firms (i.e. s = 0).
The normal wisdom is that due to absence of competition (b = 0), there is
no need for the government to help the firms further exploit their monopoly
power in the overseas market. That is true but not enough since Proposition
1 points out that, additionally, there must be no R&D spillovers between
the firms. Even when firms are monopolies but if there are R&D invest-
ment spillovers, the social benefit of undertaking R&D is high (firms benefit
from each other’s R&D investment implementation), the government has an
incentive to support the firms because this action is welfare enhancing. How-
ever, if there is no R&D investment externality, the government is willing to
leave the firms untouched. In this case, each firm’s marginal export revenue
and its marginal R&D spending cost cancel out each other. Any firm’s extra
profit will be equal to the value of R&D subsidy it receives from the govern-
ment. Consequently, the government cannot use R&D subsidy to increase
the exporting firms’ profit net of R&D subsidy cost for the welfare. This in-
dicates that the optimal policy for the government is to withhold any R&D
subsidy to the firms.
Remark 2 Results obtained in Remark 1 and Corollary 1 can be generalised
to the case of N   2 exporting firms that are Cournot rivals in an overseas
market.
From the lemma above, we obtain results that can be summarised in the
proposition below:
Proposition 1 When exporting firms only compete in an overseas market
and   6= b2 , if additionally r0
⇥
c
 +1
⇤
> 2( +1)(↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 , then:
9
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• The social optimum can be achieved as an interior Nash equilibrium
with the government taking action towards firms’ R&D activities:
q = (b+2)s2  b
x = (b+2)
2s
(2  b)( +1)   (↵ c ⌧) +1
• If   > b2 , it is optimal to subsidise firms’ R&D investment. Otherwise,
an optimal R&D tax is required.
• Trade liberalisation in the foreign market induces a higher level of op-
timal R&D subsidy provided (optimal R&D tax imposed) if there has
been such a subsidy (tax) in place.
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in the Appendix, the condition r0
⇥
c
 +1
⇤
> 2( +1)(↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 is required
for obtaining a unique interior optimal solution to the welfare maximisation
problem. This condition means that the marginal cost of R&D investment
once reaching its upper limit is so large that it outweighs all marginal benefit
of this activity. Under this condition, there are two important results. The
first result is quite interesting. The socially optimal policy turns out to be
that the government may need to tax firms’ R&D activity instead of subsid-
ising it. This can be explained on the following ground. When firms conduct
R&D and then compete with each other in a foreign market, there are two
important factors aﬀecting welfare of the entire economy. While the R&D
spillovers eﬀect (captured by  ), a positive externality, enhances domestic
welfare, the rivalry of firms (reflected through b), a negative externality, re-
duces it. In particular, when the R&D spillover intensity is relatively small
as compared to the degree of competition between firms (  < b2), the com-
petition of firms result in a net eﬀect in which the home country as a whole
fails to fully exploit its potential monopoly power in that foreign market.
Too much R&D conducted will lead to the situation of over-production for
the two domestic exporting firms. To avoid this situation, the home gov-
ernment should impose an R&D tax, at the same rate, on both firms. This
optimal R&D tax guarantees that social welfare will be maximised and firms
will have no incentive to do less or more R&D and, hence, to produce less or
more exported products. By contrast, when   > b2 , the benefit of increasing
10
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R&D is greater than its cost, providing an R&D subsidy is the optimal policy
action that the government should pursue.
The second result says that when there is a reduction in the trade cost, the
optimal action of the home government is to tax the firms’ R&D investments
more heavily if there is already a tax or to provide the firms with more
financial support if there is already a subsidy in place. This is because lower
trade cost expands firms’ export volumes and thus raises firms’ willingness to
invest in cost-reducing R&D. If the social benefits of conducting more R&D
is larger than its associated social costs (through fiercer firms’ competition),
a reduction in the trade cost induces a higher level of optimal R&D subsidy.
However, in case an R&D tax is needed, to reduce firms’ excessive R&D
spending so that over-production, which erodes the home country’s monopoly
power in the foreign market, can be avoided, the government needs to raise
the R&D tax rate. This action will result in an improvement in social welfare
because (i) when there is an R&D tax and a higher tax rate is imposed, firms
obtain more profits from exports (even though no more R&D investments
occur) and the government collects more R&D tax revenues; and (ii) when
there is an R&D subsidy, the extra profits obtained by the firms exceed the
R&D subsidy costs expended by the government.
We now examine the economic impact of trade liberalisation on the home
country. To derive the comparative static eﬀects of a reduction in ⌧ , we
diﬀerentiate the obtained equilibrium conditions with respect to ⌧ . The
results can be summarised in the proposition below:
Proposition 2 When exporting firms only compete in a foreign market and
assuming r0( c +1) >
2( +1)(↵ ⌧)
(b+2)2 , at the optimal policy action conducted by
the government, trade liberalisation in the foreign market raises firms’ cost-
reducing R&D spending, their productivity and the industry productivity. It
also enhances domestic welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
Again, the condition r0
⇥
c
 +1
⇤
> 2( +1)(↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 is imposed to guarantee the
existence of a unique interior solution to the government’s welfare maxim-
ising problem. Under this condition, the results obtained can be explained
as follows. Basically, trade liberalisation in the foreign market entails two
diﬀerent eﬀects: a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect. The direct eﬀect of a
fall in the trade cost, as explained under Proposition 1, encourages firms to
conduct more cost-reducing R&D. By contrast, the indirect eﬀect influence
firms’ R&D eﬀorts through changing the optimal R&D policy instrument.
11
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In case of an optimal R&D subsidy, the two eﬀects complement each other.
However, in case of an optimal R&D tax, although the two eﬀects work in
opposite directions, the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect one resulting in
a net positive eﬀect of an increase in R&D investments for the firms. Hence,
there will be an improvement in firms’ and industry’s productivity as well as
export volumes (because the whole exporting cost is lower). This sale expan-
sion allows firms to enjoy higher profits and the increment in profits is more
than required to oﬀset for the increase in government’s subsidy expenditure.
In the case of tax, the government gets more revenue through its higher R&D
taxation program. All this leads to a higher level of domestic welfare.
3 Adding domestic sales
In the previous section, firms are assumed to sell all of their products overseas.
Because there is no domestic consumption of firms’ product, only firms’ ex-
port sales and government expenditure/revenue matter for the social welfare.
If this assumption is relaxed, i.e. if firms are allowed to sell their products in
the home market, the strategic behaviours of firms and the home government
are expected to change significantly. This is because firms will now weigh out
between selling products at home and overseas. In addition, the government
will now need to take into account consumer surplus in calculating the social
welfare. To examine this interesting case, we slightly restructure our model
below.
In addition to the competition in the foreign market as described in Sec-
tion 2, we now further assume that competition between two exporting firms
also takes place in the home market.12 As there are now two markets, we
need to make some small changes in notation. Define the home market as
Country 1 and the foreign market as Country 2. Assume the population size
in each country is equal to 1 and consumers everywhere have the same pref-
erences for simplicity. The representative consumer in home country derives
utility from consuming goods supplied by the firms:
u1 = ↵qi1 + ↵qj1  
✓
q2i1
2
+
q2j1
2
+ bqi1qj1
◆
, b 2 [0 , 1 ), ↵ > 0 (7)
12The setting in this section not only accommodates well the competition between
Qantas and Virgin Australia as documented in Section 1 but also reflects a recent move
of several countries in additionally allowing EPZ firms to sell a certain fraction of their
products to their corresponding domestic markets.
12
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and similar for the consumer in the foreign country. Here, qi1 and qj1 denote
the consumption of goods produced by the firms. The first subscript is used to
indicate the firm producing the consumption good and the second subscript
refers to the country of consumption. The domestic consumer surplus is:
CS1 = u1   pi1qi1   pj1qj1
From this, the inverse demand function for firm i’s product (and similar for
firm j’s product) is:
pi1 = ↵  (qi1 + bqj1)
Using these results, the maximised domestic consumer surplus can be calcu-
lated as:
CS1 =
1
2
 
q2i1 + q
2
j1
 
+ bqi1qj1
The inverse demand functions for goods in the overseas market are the
same as previously described in Section 2. Hence, the profit function for firm
i is:
⇡i = [pi1   (c  xi    xj)] qi1+[pi2   (c  xi    xj)  ⌧ ] qi2 r(xi)+sixi (8)
and similar for firm j. In this profit function, the first two terms capture the
firm’s domestic sales revenue and export sales revenue respectively while the
last two terms are R&D investment spending and financial support from the
government.
Welfare of the home country will be:
W = ⇡i + ⇡j + CS1   sixi   sjxj (9)
A slight diﬀerence between this welfare function and the one defined in Sec-
tion 2 is the inclusion of consumer surplus. Any R&D policies should now
also take this component into account.
Lemma 2 Any solution equilibrium is symmetric. Assuming interior solu-
tion, a symmetric equilibrium outcome implies that si = sj = s, qi1 = qj1 =
q1, qi2 = qj2 = q2, and xi = xj = x where:
q1 =
(b+ 2)s
(b+ 5) + 1  b +
(2   b)⌧
(b+ 2) [(b+ 5) + 1  b] (10)
q2 =
(b+ 2)s
(b+ 5) + 1  b  
[(b+ 3) + 1] ⌧
(b+ 2) [(b+ 5) + 1  b] (11)
13
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x =
(b+ 2)2s
( + 1) [(b+ 5) + 1  b] +
(2   b)⌧
( + 1) [(b+ 5) + 1  b]  
↵  c
 + 1
(12)
[(b+ 5) + 1  b] (↵  c)  (2   b)⌧ < s < [(b+ 5) + 1  b]↵  (2   b)⌧
(b+ 2)2
(13)
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma provides us with interior equilibrium levels of domestic sale,
export sale and R&D investment of the firms. It also spells out the con-
dition on the equilibrium R&D subsidy following which a unique optimal
solution to the firms’ maximisation problem is obtained. Given this setting
and conditions, we can derive the following:
Proposition 3 When firms compete in both home and foreign markets, if
r0
 
c
 +1
 
> ( +1)[(b+5)↵ 2⌧ ](b+2)2 , then:
• The welfare maximising R&D subsidy expended by the government to
each firm exists and is positively valued and uniquely determined.
• Trade liberalisation in the foreign market induces an increase in this
optimal R&D subsidy level only if     b2 or   < b2 and (b+5)( +1)
2
(b+2)2 <
r00(x) < (b+1)( +1)
2
(b 2 )(b+2) .
Proof. See Appendix.
It should be noted that, similar to the condition required for the case
of no domestic sale (under Proposition 1), it is necessary that r0
 
c
 +1
 
>
( +1)[(b+5)↵ 2⌧ ]
(b+2)2 . This means that marginal cost of R&D investment evaluat-
ing at the upper threshold must be higher than its marginal benefit so that
there is more incentive for firms to undertake further R&D. Otherwise, the
production cost would fall below zero (not a sensible scenario). The results
obtained deserved some comments. Unlike the results obtained under Pro-
position 1 where an R&D tax might be imposed, when firms also trade in the
home market, the government’s optimal policy is always to subsidise R&D.
This is very much because of the consumer surplus motive. In this case,
the gain in consumer surplus due to R&D subsidy, which lowers the product
prices by lowering firms’ marginal production cost, is more than suﬃcient
to compensate for the associated costs (incurred through R&D subsidy ex-
penditure) so the government has an incentive to grant R&D subsidy to the
firms.
14
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Another diﬀerence is that the eﬀect of trade liberalization in the foreign
market on optimal R&D subsidy, to some extent, is also dependent on the
curvature of the R&D cost function.13 When the intensity of R&D spillovers
is relatively large as compared to the degree of substitutability of goods (  >
b
2), an improvement in terms of trade cost always encourages the government
to subsidize more firms’ R&D investment. By contrast, when the intensity
of R&D spillovers is not so large relatively to the degree of substitutability
of goods, whether trade liberalisation increases or decreases the subsidy rate
depends on the curvature of the R&D cost function. As we know, when trade
liberalisation occurs, firms enjoy more profits even if R&D spending is held
fixed. If the R&D cost function is highly convex (R&D investment is a very
costly activity), holding R&D investments fixed or even a slight decrease in
R&D eﬀorts will allow firms to save a great deal of R&D spending. In terms
of welfare, the society will be better oﬀ if firms do not change or conduct less
R&D because the savings (of R&D spending and R&D subsidy) obtained
from doing so more than outweighs any reduction in firms’ profits and/or
consumer surplus. To discourage firms from doing any further R&D, the
government reduces its R&D subsidy extended to firms. However, when the
R&D cost function is not so convex, the marginal benefit from implementing
an R&D project is greater than its corresponding cost, the government should
encourage firms to do more R&D by increasing the R&D subsidy level in the
face of trade liberalisation.
As for the impacts of trade liberalisation on the home economy, we can
show that:
Proposition 4 When firms compete in both home and foreign markets and
r0
 
c
 +1
 
> ( +1)[(b+5)↵ 2⌧ ](b+2)2 , at the optimal R&D subsidy, trade liberalisation
in the foreign market: (i) increases a firm’s R&D spending; (ii) increases
the firm’s export volumes, its domestic sales and, hence, its total sales; (iii)
improves the firm’s and industry productivity; and (iv) raises social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
Similarly, the condition r0
 
c
 +1
 
> ( +1)[(b+5)↵ 2⌧ ](b+2)2 is required here for
having an optimal R&D subsidy. The results that trade liberalisation in the
overseas market induces higher R&D spending of firms and, hence, lead to
the improvement of their productivity as well as the industry productivity
13Once firms are allowed to make their domestic sale, the R&D cost function matters
as it aﬀects the price perceived by the consumer (and, hence, the consumer surplus).
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are, in general, similar to the case of no domestic sales investigated under
Proposition 2. Trade liberalisation in the export market is not only welcome
by exporting firms as they can expand their output but also by their host
country. This is because it makes the domestic economy as a whole become
more eﬃcient and reap more welfare.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered diﬀerent scenarios of exporting firm com-
petition to explore the eﬀect of trade liberalisation in the foreign market and
R&D policy on firms’ incentive to innovate and social welfare. In particular,
we study in details the international setting in which firms invest in R&D
and sell their diﬀerentiated products in a foreign market. Here, R&D invest-
ment contains a positive externality. The government uses R&D subsidy as a
policy tool to maximise the social welfare. We show that the magnitude of the
R&D externality is an important factor, alongside the degree of substitutab-
ility between goods, that shapes the government’s optimal policy behaviour.
In particular, under some certain conditions involving these two factors, it
might be optimal for the government to tax R&D instead of subsidising it.
With this R&D tax put in place, trade liberalisation in the foreign market
induces the government to tax R&D more heavily as this policy response
improves the domestic welfare.
In the next step, we examine if there are any changes in the results when
firms also sell their products in the home market. It is found that the optimal
policy for the government in this case is always to provide financial support
to firms’ R&D activity (positive R&D subsidy). The impact of trade lib-
eralisation on this optimal subsidy depends on the comparison between the
R&D spillover eﬀect and the degree of substitutability between goods and,
to some extent, on the convexity of the R&D cost function.
Although the settings explored change from foreign market to both home
and foreign markets, all in all, we find that trade liberalisation in the overseas
market is always welfare enhancing as it induces higher output sales, both
at home and overseas, of firms. It also entails a higher level of cost-reducing
R&D spending which then leads to an improvement of firms’ and industry
productivity.
Overall, the results of our model are broadly in line with the literature
stressing the complementarity between innovation and export: firms are more
16
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likely to export if they innovate and are more likely to innovate if they find
good export opportunities (e.g. Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Bustos, 2011).
Although the attention in this paper is restricted to the competition of only
two firms, the model can easily be extended to a multiple firm setting. With
regards to future research, it would be interesting to investigate the case
in which firms are to form R&D joint ventures to strengthen their collective
competitiveness and export volumes. Another direction is to ask the question
of to what extent empirical evidence confirms the theoretical predictions
obtained in this paper.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Conditional on the government’s decision made regarding R&D subsidies in
the first stage, each firm chooses how much to invest in R&D and how much
to export to maximise its profit defined in (2). Observe that{xi, xj, qi, qj}
must satisfy
xi   0, qi   0, xi +  xj  c, qi + bqj  ↵
xj   0, qj   0, xj +  xi  c, qj + bqi  ↵
Hence {xi, xj, qi, qj} belongs to a compact set. The maximization problem
has a solution which is symmetric and can be written as
xi = X(si, sj), xj = X(si, sj), qi = Q(si, sj), qj = Q(sj, si)
The total welfare can be written as
W = ⇧(si, sj) + ⇧(sj, si)
The problem max{W : (sj, sj)} will yield a symmetric solution si = sj.
When the solution is interior, the first order necessary conditions for firm
i’s profit maximisation problem give:
(↵  c  ⌧) + xi +  xj   bqj   2qi = 0 (14)
qi + si   r0(xi) = 0 (15)
and similar for firm j. The Hessian matrix of the second order suﬃcient
conditions for firm i is H =
✓  2 1
1  r00(xi)
◆
and similar for firm j. It
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can be seen that |H1| =  2 < 0 and |H2| = 2r00(xi)   1 > 0 according to
Assumption 1. Hence, the second order suﬃcient conditions are satisfied for
a maximum.
In the first stage, the government, having known the firms’ strategic re-
sponse functions in (14) and (15), chooses R&D subsidy rates (si, sj) to grant
to firms in order to maximise the social welfare defined in (3) which can now
be rewritten as:
W = q2i   r(xi) + q2j   r(xj)
Setting @W@si = 0 and
@W
@sj
= 0 yields the following:
2qi.
@qi
@si
  r0(xi).@xi@si + 2qj.
@qj
@si
  r0(xj).@xj@si = 0
2qi.
@qi
@sj
  r0(xi).@xi@sj + 2qj.
@qj
@sj
  r0(xj).@xj@sj = 0
where qi and xi (and, similarly, qj and xj) are given in (14) and (15). It can
be seen that the first order conditions yield a symmetric outcome at which
si = sj = s, qi = qj = q, and xi = xj = x.
From (14) and (15), the following is obtained:
q = ↵ c ⌧+( +1)xb+2
Using this result to recalculate the social welfare we have:
W = 2
⇣
↵ c ⌧+( +1)x
b+2
⌘2   r(x) 
In what follows, we assume interior solutions for both profit maximisation of
firms and welfare maximisation of the government. After diﬀerentiating the
above welfare function with respect to s, setting it to zero and using (14)
and (15), we obtain:
s = (2  b)qb+2
Proof of Proposition 1
We will prove this proposition in two parts. In the first part, we prove the
existence of a unique value of s. We then indicate that s can either be pos-
itive (i.e. an optimal subsidy) or negative (i.e. an optimal tax) depending
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on values of relevant parameters. In the last part, we examine the compar-
ative statics on this policy variable with regard to a decrease in ⌧ (trade
liberalisation).
When   6= b2 , for any given level of subsidy provided from the government,
the equilibrium export volume is:
q =
(b+ 2)s
2   b (16)
Inserting the result in (16) into (14) and (15) under symmetry delivers:
x =
(b+ 2)2s
(2   b)( + 1)  
(↵  c  ⌧)
 + 1
(17)
Because export volume and R&D investment are non-negative, we must have
s
2  b > 0. This implies either s > 0 when   >
b
2 or s < 0 when   <
b
2 .
To simplify notation, let ✓ = s2  b > 0. We next identify conditions that
need to be imposed on ✓ to make sure that the firms’ profit maximisation
problem yield interior solutions. More specifically, we need:
0 < (1 + b)q < ↵
0 < ( + 1)x < c
While the first condition guarantees positive quantities and prices of the
goods, the second one is necessary for having plausible positive R&D invest-
ments. Using the result in (16), the double inequalities 0 < (1 + b)q < ↵
imply 0 < ✓ < ↵(b+1)(b+2) . Using (17), the double inequalities 0 < ( +1)x < c
imply (↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 > ✓ >
(↵ c ⌧)
(b+2)2 . Combining these two results, the range of value
for ✓ is (↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 > ✓ >
(↵ c ⌧)
(b+2)2 .
It can be seen that the function W is strictly concave in x. Indeed, we
have @2W@x2 = 2
h
2( +1)2
(b+2)2   r00(x)
i
. Since r00(x).(b + 2)2 > (b + 5)(  + 1)2 >
2(  + 1)2, 8b 2 (0, 1), 8  2 [0, 1] following Assumption 2 then @2W@x2 < 0.
Because x is aﬃne in s according to (17), W is also strictly concave in s. We
will next show that there exists a unique interior solution to the government’s
welfare maximising problem.
Substituting the obtained results into (15) gives:
2( + 1)✓   r0(x) = 0 (18)
We consider the LHS of (18) which is a function of ✓: f(✓) = 2( +1)✓ r0(x).
Diﬀerentiating this function with respect to ✓ yields:
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f 0(✓) = 2( + 1)  r00(x).@x@✓ = 2( +1)
2 r00(x).(b+2)2
 +1
Because r00(x).(b+2)2 > 2( +1)2, 8b 2 (0, 1),  2 [0, 1] based on Assumption
1, f 0(✓) < 0 meaning that the LHS of (18) is a decreasing function of ✓ while
its RHS is equal to zero. At ✓ = (↵ c ⌧)(b+2)2 , f(✓) =
2( +1)(↵ c ⌧)
(b+2)2 > 0. When
✓ = (↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 , f(✓) =
2( +1)(↵ ⌧)
(b+2)2   r0( c +1) < 0 because r0
 
c
 +1
 
> 2( +1)(↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 as
per our above stated assumption (inside the statement of the proposition).
Hence, there exists a unique positive value of ✓ that solves (18).
Note that the first and second derivatives of the welfare function with
respect to s are:
@W
@s =
2(b+2)2
(2  b)( +1) [2( + 1)✓   r0(x)]
@2W
@s2 =
2(b+2)2
(2  b)2( +1)2 [2( + 1)
2   r00(x)(b+ 2)2]
Clearly, the condition @W@s = 0 is equivalent to that of (18) and
@2W
@s2 has
a same sign as 2(  + 1)2   r00(x)(b + 2)2. With (↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 > ✓ > (↵ c ⌧)(b+2)2 , the
welfare function is concave over its domain and has a maximum. Therefore,
s = (2    b)✓ is the unique optimal R&D policy measure that should be
applied by the government to the firms’ R&D eﬀorts in order to maximise
the social welfare. When   > b2 , s > 0, there is an optimal R&D subsidy
conducted. However, when   < b2 , s < 0, it is optimal to have an R&D tax
instead.
The condition r0
 
c
 +1
 
> 2( +1)(↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 carries some special economic mean-
ing. Clearly, c +1 is the upper limit on firms’ cost reducing R&D investment
at which their production cost will be driven down to zero. This means
that r0
 
c
 +1
 
is the marginal cost of R&D investment once reaching this up-
per limit. Meanwhile, 2( +1)(↵ ⌧)(b+2)2 is the maginal benefit of R&D investment
evaluating at this threshold level. It is required that marginal cost of R&D
investment is greater than its marginal benefit at this point as otherwise there
would be incentive for firms making further R&D investment and production
cost would be negative (which is implausible).
Regarding the impact of trade liberalisation in the overseas market, dif-
ferentiating both sides of (18) with respect to ⌧ and rearranging we get:h
2( +1)2 r00(x).(b+2)2
 +1
i
@✓
@⌧ =
r00(x)
 +1
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Because the term in the square bracket on the LHS is negative while the RHS
is always positive, we have @✓@⌧ < 0. Now, translating that into the relation-
ship between s and ⌧ , this implies @s@⌧ = (2   b) @✓@⌧ . Clearly, if   > b2 , s > 0,
and @s@⌧ < 0. As this is the case of an optimal R&D subsidy, other things
equal, trade liberalisation (a smaller ⌧) induces a higher level of optimal R&D
subsidy provided to firms. By contrast, if   < b2 , s < 0, and
@s
@⌧ > 0. In this
case, a decrease in ⌧ leads to a corresponding decrease in s (s becomes more
negative). In other words, a higher level of optimal R&D tax should be levied.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of this proposition is quite straightforward. Indeed, making use of
(16) and (17) and the result of @✓@⌧ obtained in the proof of Proposition 1, we
get:
@x
@⌧ =
(b+2)2
( +1) .
@✓
@⌧ +
1
 +1 =
2( +1)
2( +1)2 r00(x).(b+2)2 < 0
@q
@⌧ = (b+ 2).
@✓
@⌧ < 0
These mean that trade liberalisation (lower ⌧) leads to an expansion of both
R&D investments and export volumes of firms at the optimal policy measure
that the government conducts.
Due to symmetry, in equilibrium, firms’ and industry productivity are
the same Z = z = 1c ( +1)x . Diﬀerentiating this with respect to ⌧ delivers:
@Z
@⌧ =
@z
@⌧ =
 +1
[c ( +1)x]2 .
@x
@⌧ < 0
A decrease in the trade cost helps strengthen firms’ as well as the industry’s
average productivity. Regarding what happens to the whole society, the
eﬀect on welfare is:
@W
@⌧ = 2
⇥
2q. @q@⌧   r0(x).@x@⌧
⇤
= 2
h
(b+ 2)2.2( +1)✓ r
0(x)
 +1 .
@✓
@⌧   r
0(x)
 +1
i
A close look at the first term inside the square bracket indicates that it is
equal to zero according to equation (18). Hence, @W@⌧ < 0 or W is decreasing
in ⌧ . A fall in ⌧ will increase W or welfare increases with trade liberalisation
in the foreign market.
Proof of Lemma 2
The first order conditions from firm i’s profit maximisation problem are:
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(↵  c) + xi +  xj   bqj1   2qi1 = 0 (19)
(↵  c  ⌧) + xi +  xj   bqj2   2qi2 = 0 (20)
qi1 + qi2 + si   r0(xi) = 0 (21)
and similar for firm j. The Hessian matrix of second order conditions are
H =
0@  2 0 10  2 1
1 1  r00(xi)
1A. We have |H1| =  2 < 0, |H2| = 4 > 0, and
|H3| = 4 [1  r00(xi)] < 0 meaning the second order conditions are satisfied
for a maximum.
In the first stage, the aggregate welfare is:
W = 3q
2
i1
2 + q
2
i2   r(xi) + 3q
2
j1
2 + q
2
j2   r(xj) + bqi1qj1
The government’s welfare maximisation delivers the first order conditions:
3qi1.
@qi1
@si
+ 2qi2.
@qi2
@si
  r0(xi).@xi@si + 3qj1.
@qj1
@si
+ 2qj2.
@qj2
@si
  r0(xj).@xj@si +
bqi1.
@qj1
@si
+ bqj1.
@qi1
@si
= 0
3qi1.
@qi1
@sj
+ 2qi2.
@qi2
@sj
  r0(xi).@xi@sj + 3qj1.
@qj1
@sj
+ 2qj2.
@qj2
@sj
  r0(xj).@xj@sj +
bqi1.
@qj1
@sj
+ bqj1.
@qi1
@sj
= 0
where qi1, qi2, and xi (and similar for qj1, qj2, and xj) are given in (19)
- (21). These equations imply a symmetric outcome where si = sj = s,
qi1 = qj1 = q1, qi2 = qj2 = q2, and xi = xj = x. Using this symmetric result
to recalculate the social welfare we get:
W = (b+ 3)q21 + 2q
2
2   2r(x)
which in turn imply the following after re-deriving the first order condition:
q1 [(3 + b) + 1] + q2(2   b)  (b+ 2)s = 0
Using this result, we can figure out:
q1 =
(b+2)s
(b+5) +1 b +
(2  b)⌧
(b+2)[(b+5) +1 b]
q2 =
(b+2)s
(b+5) +1 b   [(b+3) +1]⌧(b+2)[(b+5) +1 b]
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x = (b+2)
2s
( +1)[(b+5) +1 b] +
(2  b)⌧
( +1)[(b+5) +1 b]   ↵ c +1
Now, we check for the second order condition:
@2W
@s2 =
2(b+2)2
[(b+5) +1 b]2
h
b+ 5  r00(x). (b+2)2( +1)2
i
It is easy to check that maxb2[0,1) b+5(b+2)2 =
5
4 . From Assumption 1 and given
that   2 [0, 1] then we have @2W@s2 < 0 implying that the second order condition
is satisfied for a maximum.
To make sure that quantities and prices are positive, we need to impose
that 0 < (  + 1)x < c, and 0 < (b + 1)q1 < ↵, as well as 0 < (b + 1)q2 < ↵.
These lead to the following:
[(b+5) +1 b](↵ c) (2  b)⌧
(b+2)2 < s <
[(b+5) +1 b]↵ (2  b)⌧
(b+2)2
Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting results in (10) and (11) into (21) and rearranging gives:
(b+ 5)( + 1)s
(b+ 5) + 1  b  
(b+ 1)( + 1)⌧
(b+ 2) [(b+ 5) + 1  b]   r
0(x) = 0 (22)
Now define h(s) = (b+5)( +1)s(b+5) +1 b   (b+1)( +1)⌧(b+2)[(b+5) +1 b]   r0(x). We have:
h0(s) = (b+5)( +1)(b+5) +1 b   r00(x).@x@s = (b+5)( +1)(b+5) +1 b   r00(x). (b+2)
2
( +1)[(b+5) +1 b]
As r00(x).(b + 2)2 > (b + 5)(  + 1)2 as per Assumption 2 then h0(s) < 0
or LHS of (22) is decreasing in s. In the meantime, the RHS of (22) is
constant at zero. Given the range of s specified in (13) then the range of
value of h(s) should be ( +1)[(b+5)↵ 2⌧ ](b+2)2   r0
 
c
 +1
 
< h(s) < ( +1)[(b+5)(↵ c) 2⌧ ](b+2)2 .
Obviously, ( +1)[(b+5)(↵ c) 2⌧ ](b+2)2 > 0 because ↵   c   ⌧ > 0. Hence, as soon
as ( +1)[(b+5)↵ 2⌧ ](b+2)2   r0
 
c
 +1
 
< 0 or ( +1)[(b+5)↵ 2⌧ ](b+2)2 < r
0   c
 +1
 
, (22) yields a
positive and unique solution s (it can be verified that the lower bound on
s given in (13) is greater than zero). Economically, this means that the
marginal cost of R&D evaluating at its upper bound (where production cost
is zero) must be greater than its benefit. This will prevent any further R&D
investment from happening and the production cost does not get negative
values.
Diﬀerentiating both sides of (22) with respect to ⌧ and rearranging gives:
@s
@⌧
=
(b+ 1)( + 1)2 + (2   b)(b+ 2)r00(x)
(b+ 2) [(b+ 5)( + 1)2   (b+ 2)2r00(x)] (23)
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It should be noted that the denominator is always negative. As for the nu-
merator, it is positive if     b2 or   < b2 and (b+5)( +1)
2
(b+2)2 < r
00(x) < (b+1)( +1)
2
(b 2 )(b+2) .
In that case the whole fraction @s@⌧ < 0 or s is decreasing in ⌧ . A decrease
in ⌧ will result in an increase in s at the optimal. When r00(x) > (b+1)( +1)
2
(b 2 )(b+2)
for   < b2 the numerator is negative so
@s
@⌧ > 0 or s is increasing in ⌧ . When
r00(x) = (b+1)( +1)
2
(b 2 )(b+2) for   <
b
2 ,
@s
@⌧ = 0 implying that s is unaﬀected by a
change in ⌧ .
Proof of Proposition 4
Using (10) - (12) and then (23), we obtain the following partial derivatives:
@q1
@⌧ =
2( +1)2
(b+2)[(b+5)( +1)2 (b+2)2r00(x)] < 0
@q2
@⌧ =
(b+2)2r00(x) (b+3)( +1)2
(b+2)[(b+5)( +1)2 (b+2)2r00(x)] < 0
@x
@⌧ =
2( +1)
[(b+5)( +1)2 (b+2)2r00(x)] < 0
Defining q = q1 + q2 as a firm’s total sales then:
@q
@⌧ =
@q1
@⌧ +
@q2
@⌧ < 0
The industry productivity is equal to firm’s productivity Z = z = 1c ( +1)x .
Diﬀerentiating this with respect to ⌧ delivers:
@Z
@⌧ =
@z
@⌧ =
 +1
[c ( +1)x]2 .
@x
@⌧ < 0
As for the welfare eﬀect, we have:
@W
@⌧ = (b+ 3).2q1.
@q1
@⌧ + 4q2.
@q2
@⌧   2r0(x).@x@⌧
Substituting (22) and the results derived above into this equation and sim-
plifying we get:
@W
@⌧ =
4{[(b+3) +1]⌧ s(b+2)2}
(b+2)2[(b+5) +1 b]
Note that the denominator of this fraction is positive. Given the range of
value of s in (13), we can work out that:
  [(b+ 5) + 1  b] (↵  ⌧)  [(b+ 3) + 1] ⌧   s(b+ 2)2 
  [(b+ 5) + 1  b] (↵  ⌧   c)
This means that [(b+ 3) + 1] ⌧   s(b + 2)2 < 0. Hence, we can conclude
@W
@⌧ < 0.
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